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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. LARSON, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant : Case No. 920711-CA 
vs. : Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a : 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS : 
COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation; et al., : 
Defendants-Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a civil 
case in a District Court. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992). As 
authorized by § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case 
to the Court of Appeals by order entered October 23, 1992. (R. 
553) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1« Does the statute of limitations commence to run in a 
products liability case prior to the time that the plaintiff 
discovers both the fact of injury and the causal relationship 
between the injury and the product? This presents a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial 
court. Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the presence of disputed factual issues preclude 
summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue, where the 
evidence would support a finding that plaintiff filed his action 
within four years of discovering the causal connection between his 
injuries and defendant's product? The propriety of summary 
judgment is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness with no 
deference to the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 
102 (Utah 1992). 
3. May a trial court resolve disputed factual issues 
regarding a statute of limitations issue adversely to the plaintiff 
following a bench evidentiary hearing, even though plaintiff had 
requested and was entitled to a jury trial? The issue of whether 
the trial court had authority to make factual findings on a jury 
issue is a question of law which should be reviewed for correct-
ness. See State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellant is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This is a civil products 
liability action. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Jury Demand on August 
29, 1988. Each of the defendant's answered and asserted, among 
other defenses, that the action was barred by the statute of 
limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). 
(Retep Answer, R. 26-29; Thatcher Answer, R. 36-46; PPG and Diamond 
Shamrock Answer, R. 53-58; Wasatch Answer, R. 59-65.) Wasatch 
Chemical also cross-claimed against all other defendants for 
indemnification or contribution. (R. 59-65) 
Defendant, Thatcher Chemical Company, moved for a summary 
judgment on April 18, 1990, arguing that plaintiff had failed to 
show that Thatcher supplied any of the product which injured 
plaintiff. (R. 261-63) Defendants, PPG Industries, Inc., and 
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, filed their motion for summary 
judgment on May 25, 1990, asserting that plaintiff's claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 300-02) On July 26, 
1990, defendant, Wasatch Chemical Company, joined in the summary 
judgment motions of Thatcher and of PPG Industries and Diamond 
Shamrock. 
An initial hearing on the summary judgment motions was held 
July 30, 1990. All defendants joined in the motions of the other 
defendants. The court held the motions in abeyance for 90 days to 
allow further discovery. (R. 405) Wasatch Chemical filed its own 
motion for summary judgment on August 7, 1990, following the 
hearing. (R. 416-17) 
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On November 15, 1990, plaintiff stipulated that his claims 
against Thatcher Chemical Company be dismissed with prejudice based 
on the lack of evidence to support the claims against Thatcher. 
(R. 508-09) Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of claims 
against Wasatch Chemical Company on January 15, 1991. (R. 521-23) 
The order dismissing Wasatch Chemical provides that the parties are 
to bear their own costs and attorney's fees, thereby implicitly 
resolving Wasatch Chemical's cross-claim. 
The second hearing on PPG and Diamond Shamrock's motion for 
summary judgment occurred January 7, 1991. The trial court took 
the matter under advisement, but also requested that the parties 
schedule a hearing to present testimony. (R. 520) The evidentiary 
hearing requested by the trial court was held June 3, 1991. (R. 
528) Following the hearing, on December 5, 1991, the trial court 
issued its memorandum decision determining that plaintiff's claims 
were barred by the statute of limitations. A formal Order and 
Judgment was entered January 17, 1992. (R. 534-39) Plaintiff 
timely filed his notice of appeal on February 14, 1992. (R. 540-
42) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
As is appropriate in a summary judgment proceeding, the 
following facts are stated in the light most favorable to plain-
tiff. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
In May, 1964, at the age of 19, plaintiff started work for 
Black & Decker as a tool repairman. (R. 837) His duties included 
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disassembling tools, cleaning the parts in a solvent, and repair-
ing, reassembling and testing the tool. (R. 838) The solvent used 
was vaporized trichloroethylene (TCE). (R. 838, 846-849) 
Trichloroethylene is now recognized as toxic solvent which can have 
adverse effects including headaches, drowsiness, distorted 
perceptions, and liver damage. See Richard J. Lewis, Sr., 
Hazardous Chemicals Desk Reference 1137-38 (2d ed. 1991). 
Over the next five years, until he was promoted to manager in 
1969, plaintiff used the TCE in a vapor degreaser on an average of 
15 to 20 times per day. (R. 853) Even as manager, plaintiff would 
still occasionally perform repairs and use the vapor degreaser, 
although not as frequently as before. (R. 859) Even when not 
working with the solvent, the vapor could be smelled anywhere in 
the building, although plaintiff soon got used to the smell and 
didn't notice it. (R. 829, 981) Plaintiff's exposure to the TCE 
continued until 1971 or 1972, when Black & Decker switched to a 
different type of solvent. (R. 843, 951-53) 
In August, 1964, three months after starting with Black & 
Decker, plaintiff married his wife, Marilyn, whom he had been 
dating for over a year. (R. 903-04, 1464) About the same time, 
Marilyn started noticing periodic changes in Robert's personality. 
(R. 1465-66) Marilyn at first assumed it was due to the pressure 
of a new job, being engaged, and repairing a home for the couple to 
move into. (R. 1465) Some time later, Robert starting complaining 
of headaches. (R. 1467) Robert's mother thought that the now 
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frequent headaches and other illnesses in her previously health 
son, could be blamed on the lack of adequate care from Marilyn. 
(R. 1467) 
The TCE has caused a myriad of problems for Robert Larson, 
including headaches, a general lack of energy, lethargy, irritabil-
ity, memory loss, a higher than normal incidence of misplacing 
things, mood changes, confusion, bleeding sinuses, inability to 
handle stress, personality changes, depression, hyper-sensitivity 
to smells, and decreased sex drive.1 (R. 1000-1003) The Larsons 
consulted the family doctor concerning the headaches and the bloody 
sinuses (R. 1006, 570), and consulted with marriage counselors 
concerning the emotional and behavioral problems. (R. 564, 891) 
On some occasions, Robert's behavior became violent. For 
example, he threatened to kill his wife and children on more than 
one occasion. (R. 1471.) He would harshly verbally abuse his 
children when he was angry, such that his children were scared to 
death of him. (R. 1475-76.) Mr. Larson, however, would have no 
memory afterwards of these incidents. (R. 1012, 1471-72) Marilyn 
k)n remand, plaintiff will also present evidence that he 
discovered, after filing the notice of appeal in this case, that he 
now suffers from liver disorders which a physician has opined was 
caused by the exposure to solvents including trichloroethylene. 
Alternatively, in the event this Court affirms the dismissal of 
plaintiff's claim, plaintiff reserves the option to file a new 
action to seek recovery for the newly discovered injuries, 
consistent with the rationale of Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. , 534 
F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 1976); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 165 Cal. Rptr. 591, 594-97 
(1980); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982), and similar cases. 
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sought relief from Robert's behavior by going to a marriage 
counselor, which did temporarily relieve the problem. (R. 1469) 
In addition to the marriage counselors, both Robert and 
Marilyn Larson consulted with their family doctor concerning 
Robert's headaches. The medication prescribed by the doctor made 
Robert very ill and he did not seek further assistance from the 
doctor. (R. 566) 
Neither Robert nor Marilyn associated the headaches, personal-
ity changes, or other symptoms with his exposure to TCE at work. 
In fact, the headaches and abusive behavior were more pronounced on 
weekends when he was away from work. (R. 1470) Gradually, the 
abusive behavior decreased, and Marilyn assumed that her husband 
was finally mellowing as a result of the marital counseling. She 
did not realize at the time that the improvement occurred at 
approximately the same time that Black & Decker stopped using TCE 
solvent. (R. 1473) 
The TCE purchased by Black & Decker came in 55 gallon barrels 
with no distinctive markings or warnings, except that one barrel 
warned against inhaling the vapors through a cigarette. (R. 855) 
There were no warning instructions on the vapor degreaser. (R. 
852) No written or oral warnings concerning the use of TCE were 
given to Robert Larson or other employees. (R. 992) The only time 
plaintiff or other employees used any protective clothing or 
breathing devices was when cleaning the vapor degreaser, when a 
respirator mask was worn. (R. 857) 
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In the Fall of 1984, the Larsons watched a television 
documentary about various chemicals, including TCE. (R. 567-68) 
The program described the side effects of the chemicals, which 
closely matched the symptoms Robert Larson had experienced starting 
with his exposure to the TCE. (R. 1461) Larsons thereafter 
contacted additional physicians, and finally found some that could 
help alleviate the problems. (R. 568) They commenced this action 
to recover for their injuries, less than four years later in 
August, 1988. (R. 2-9) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A cause of action does not arise until both an injury occurs 
and the injured persons becomes aware of how the injury was caused. 
Courts in other states have applied such a discovery rule to 
chemical injury cases. Good policy reasons support applying a 
discovery rule in this case. 
The question of when a plaintiff discovers who or what causes 
his injuries is an issue of fact. The facts in this case would 
support a jury finding that plaintiff reasonably did not discover 
the cause of his injuries until viewing a television program about 
trichloroethylene. His symptoms were worse when away from work 
where the chemical exposure occurred. Plaintiff was not personally 
aware of the behavioral changes the chemical caused, and had he 
been aware would likely have attributed the changes to the stress 
of a new marriage and new job. Plaintiff consulted a physician 
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about his injuries and had no compelling reason to shop around for 
another physician. 
The trial court erred in holding a hearing and resolving 
factual matters against plaintiff. Plaintiff had requested a jury 
trial, and was entitled to have the jury determine the factual 
issues related to the statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ACCRUE UNTIL PLAINTIFF BOTH 
SUFFERED AN INJURY AND DISCOVERED THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY. 
The trial court held that plaintiff's claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-25(3) (1992), 
which provides that ,f[a]n action for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law" shall be commenced "within four years." The defendants 
had the burden of proof on this issue. "[T]he statute of limita-
tions is an affirmative defense in which burden is upon the 
defendants to prove that the action was not commenced within [the 
statutory period] after the plaintiff discovered the wrongdoing." 
Stewart v. K&S Co.. Inc.. 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979). In 
addition, because the ruling was made on a motion for summary 
judgment, it is reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). Summary 
judgment can be granted only if the depositions and other materials 
in the record, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, fail to 
raise an issue of fact. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc. . 
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773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Any doubts should be resolved in 
favor of allowing the case to proceed to trial. King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992). 
Two events must occur before a cause of action arises and 
starts the running of the statute of limitations. Suffering an 
injury is the first event. Second, the injured person must become 
aware of the causal relationship between the injury and the 
prospective defendant. Foil v. Ballincrer, 601 P.2d 144, 147-48 
(Utah 1979); Deschamos v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) .2 Stated differently, "a cause of action does not accrue and 
the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff 
learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action." 
2Although both Foil and Deschamps were concerned with a claim 
for medical malpractice, their logic applies with equal force to 
plaintiff's claim in the instant action. Justice Stewart stated 
the basis for the rule: 
While the recipient may be aware of a disability or 
dysfunction, there may be, to the untutored understanding 
of the average layman, no apparent connection between the 
treatment provided by a physician and the injury suf-
fered. Even if there is, it may be passed off as an 
unavoidable side effect or a side effect that will pass 
with time. Indeed, common experience teaches that one 
often suffers pain and other physical difficulties 
without knowing or suspecting the true cause, and may, as 
often happens, ascribe a totally erroneous cause to the 
manifestations. Even those who are trained in medical 
science often require the additional expertise of one 
possessing specialty training to diagnose properly the 
cause of certain ailments. 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147. 
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Klinaer v. Kiahtlv, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990) (footnote 
omitted). 
These exceptions to the general statutes of limitation are 
sometimes described as a "discovery rule." The Utah Supreme Court 
first described the discovery rule in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 
84 (Utah 1981). The Court noted three situations where discovery 
rules apply: 
The three circumstances set out in Myers 
whereby this Court will apply the discovery 
rule are where (1) the legislature has adopted 
the discovery rule by statute; (2) there is 
proof of concealment or misleading by the 
defendant; and (3) application of the general 
statute of limitation rule would be irrational 
or unjust. 
Klinaer. 791 P.2d at 872. 
The exceptions to statutes of limitation are in part of 
product of the modern age. "The simple fact is that rules 
developed against the relatively unsophisticated backdrops of 
barroom brawls, intersection collisions and slips and falls lose 
some of their relevance in these days of miracle drugs with their 
wondrous, unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed 
side effects." Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 
Cal. App. 3d 316, 324, 165 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1980) 
Myers applied a balancing test to determine whether the 
discovery rule should apply in a particular case. There are good 
policy reasons for applying such a rule to this case. Although 
plaintiff certainly knew that he had been using trichloroethylene, 
and knew that he was suffering physical ailments not previously 
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experienced, there was no obvious link between the two. The 
symptoms did not appear the first day he was exposed, but appeared 
gradually over a period of years. Plaintiff and his wife reason-
ably could and did attribute many of the symptoms as being marital 
problems occasioned by the stress of a new job and marriage. 
Defendants, on the other hand, were much more likely to have been 
in a position to know and to have warned of the hazardous effects 
of exposure to trichloroethylene. While some evidence may be 
difficult to locate because of the passage of time, that disadvan-
tage will weigh more heavily on plaintiff, who has the burden of 
proof. 
Courts similarly faced with delayed discovery of the con-
nection between chemical exposure and injuries have held the claim 
does not arise until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and 
the causal link. In Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th 
Cir. 1980) , the plaintiff worked as a meat wrapper from 1950 
through 1972. The meat was wrapped with a clear plastic film 
coated with polyvinyl chloride (PVC), which gave off toxic fumes 
when cut by a heated wire. Her symptoms appeared a few months 
before she quit her work. Several doctors were unable to diagnosis 
the cause of her problems. The plaintiff suspected a link to the 
fumes, but "testified that she had no information of a definite 
link between the polyvinyl chloride fumes and her disease until she 
began to get bulletins from her Union in July, August and 
September, 1975." 637 F.2d at 736. A November 5, 1973, article in 
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the Journal of the American Medical Association posited that the 
fumes might be causing a problem and solicited input from others to 
determine if there was a relationship. The evidence showed that 
neither lay nor medical persons would have associated the symptoms 
with the cause. The court applied the discovery rule and held the 
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Similarly, in Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co. , Inc. , 129 Cal. App. 
3d 865, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1982), the court held that the 
discovery rule is an exception to the rule that the cause of action 
accrues when the wrongful act takes place, which applies "when the 
pathological effect occurs without perceptible trauma and the 
victim is blamelessly ignorant of the cause of the injury; in that 
case, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
person knows or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered the cause of injury." 181 Cal. Rptr at 369 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiff in that 
case noticed a rash a few weeks after a chemical spilled on him, 
but the rash went away after a few weeks. Sometime later the 
plaintiff noticed swelling in his legs. He asked one doctor about 
the swelling while visiting the doctor for an unrelated ailment, 
and later visited the doctor solely about the swelling. Several 
doctors noted a probable correlation between the chemical exposure 
and the plaintiff's subsequent liver ailments, but the doctors did 
not communicate their concerns to the plaintiff. The court held 
the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
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Other courts have generally held that a discovery rule may 
apply in a products liability cause of action. E.g., Comment, 
Statute of Limitations—Discovery Rule—When Cause of Injury in 
Products Liability Action is Arcane, Discovery Rule Bars Running of 
Statute of Limitations Until Plaintiff's Suspicion of Cause 
Receives Some Reasonable Medical Support, Graves v. Church & Dwight 
Co.. Inc., 115 N.J. 256, 558 A.2d 463 (1989), 21 Rutgers Law J. 669 
(1990); Annot., Statute of Limitations: Running of Statute of 
Limitations on Products Liability Claim Against Manufacturer as 
Affected bv Plaintiff's Lack of Knowledge of Defect Allegedly 
Causing Personal Injury or Disease, 91 A.L.R.3d 991 § 4 (Supp. 
1991). 
The determination of whether a discovery rule applies is a 
question of law. Klinger v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 
1990). This Court should hold that plaintiff's claim did not arise 
until plaintiff discovered both his injury and the causal con-
nection between the injury and the exposure to trichloroethylene. 
POINT II 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE 
OF WHEN PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN HIS INJURIES 
AND HIS EXPOSURE TO TRICHLOROETHYLENE. 
Summary judgment can be granted only if the depositions and 
other materials in the record, and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, fail to raise an issue of fact. Ron Case Roofing and 
Asphalt Paving, Inc., 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of allowing the case to proceed to 
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trial. King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 865 
(Utah 1992). The trial court held: 
[P]laintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four 
years before making any effort to learn the 
cause of his symptoms was not justified, and 
reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to 
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt 
to determine whether his symptoms were caused 
by exposure to trichlorolethylene [sic] prior 
to viewing the unidentified television program 
sometime in 1984. 
R. 536. 
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the facts in this case, 
viewed as required in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
establish that plaintiff made an effort to determine the cause of 
his symptoms, sought treatment for what he believed was the cause 
of the symptoms, and reasonably should not have known of the cause 
of his injuries until viewing the television program in the fall of 
1984. The presence of a justiciable issue is illustrated by 
comparing the instant facts with the facts in following cases. 
In several cases involving chemical exposure, the courts have 
upheld the bar of the statute of limitations because the evidence 
showed that the plaintiff strongly suspected, soon after exposure 
to a toxic chemical, that his or her injuries were caused by the 
chemical, but failed to understand the full severity of the 
injuries. In contrast, there is no evidence that the instant 
plaintiff had any inkling that his discomforts were caused by 
trichloroethylene. The leading case of this nature is Albertson v. 
T.J. Stevenson & Co., Inc. , 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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Albertson was a seaman on board an ocean-going vessel from November 
1968 to February 1969, and as part of his duties was required to 
clean electrical parts with TCE. He had used TCE on prior 
occasions, but never full strength. He testified he "knew TCE was 
a dangerous chemical requiring special precautions and that a label 
on some of the TCE canisters warned against prolonged use of the 
chemical as creating a potential for liver damage." 749 F.2d at 
226. On the voyage he lost consciousness and experienced severe 
headaches on five or six occasions, and after the last and most 
severe episode told his superiors that he would not apply TCE 
again. From 1969 to 1972 he experienced blackouts, nausea, and 
hallucinations, and he began hearing voices. In late 1972 he 
attempted suicide to avoid the voices. 
In 1980 a doctor informed Albertson that there was probably a 
causal connection between the TCE and his symptoms. Albertson 
filed suit July 17, 1981. The court described two types of 
injuries for purposes of statutes of limitation: 
It is generally accepted that a cause of 
action for a tort accrues when there has been 
an invasion of the plaintiff's legally pro-
tected interest. Ordinarily, this invasion 
occurs at the time the tortious act is commit-
ted. If some injury is discernible when the 
tortious act occurs, the time of event rule 
respecting statutes of limitations applies, 
and the plaintiff's cause of action is deemed 
to have accrued. If the plaintiff later 
discovers that his injuries are more serious 
than originally thought, his cause of action 
nevertheless accrues on the earlier date, the 
date he realized that he had sustained harm 
from the tortious act. 
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In some cases, however, the injured 
person may not realize that a tort has been 
committed upon his person, since he may sus-
tain a latent injury which either is not or 
cannot be discovered until long after the 
tortious act that caused the injury has oc-
curred and after the applicable statute of 
limitations otherwise would have run. In such 
a case, courts have routinely applied the so-
called discovery rule to toll the running of 
the statute of limitations. When the dis-
covery rule applies, the plaintiff's cause of 
action does not accrue on the date the tor-
tious act occurred, but on the date the plain-
tiff discovers, or reasonably should have 
discovered, both the injury and its cause. 
749 F.2d 228-29 (citations omitted). 
The court discussed several latent injury cases where courts 
had allowed actions many years after the initial injury, and 
concluded: 
In each of the pure latent injury cases set 
out above, the plaintiffs were victims of 
postponed awareness of their injury, the cause 
of their injury, or both their injury and its 
cause. Logic and sound jurisprudence mandate 
the conclusion that a plaintiff's cause of 
action does not accrue under these circum-
stances until the injury and the cause are 
knowable. 
749 F.2d at 231. 
The Albertson court held that Albertson's case was a traumatic 
event/latent manifestation case, because he both knew of the injury 
and its cause at the time of the first exposure. The court 
accordingly affirmed the summary judgment dismissing his case. 
Another case where the plaintiff suspected a chemical causal 
link is Clav v. Union Carbide Corp. , 8a8 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987). 
From 1969 to mid-1976, the plaintiff worked on the Mississippi 
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River as a pilot aboard pushboats that carried toxic chemicals. He 
filed suit September 6, 1985, alleging he inhaled the fumes causing 
"laryngitis, difficulty breathing, nausea, burning eyes, headaches, 
bronchitis, memory loss, mental confusion, dizziness, prostate 
gland trouble, erratic heartbeats, sinus congestion, and a 
productive cough." He complained to the captain that the chemicals 
were making him sick, and told a doctor that he thought his 
symptoms were caused by the chemical exposure. His symptoms 
improved and he felt better when he was not working on the boats. 
He changed jobs in 1977 to avoid further chemical exposure. In 
1985 a doctor diagnosed his problems as being caused in part by 
chemical exposure. The plaintiff claimed he didn't possess the 
critical facts necessary to start the statute of limitations 
running until visiting the doctor. 
Relying on Albert son v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 
(5th Cir. 1984), the Clay court affirmed summary judgment dismis-
sing the case, largely because the plaintiff suspected at the time 
that his discomfort was caused by the chemicals. The court left 
open the possibility that the statute would not run if the 
plaintiff wasn't aware of the relation: 
Clay argues strongly that when a worker suf-
fers minor physical annoyances, such as head-
aches, transient dizziness, or congestion that 
he causally connects to his work environment, 
such knowledge should not be considered an 
invasion of a legal interest sufficient to 
start the statute of limitations running 
against him thereby precluding suit when he is 
later found to be suffering from a serious 
occupational illness. Clay's argument has 
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merit and is not foreclosed by Albertson. In 
fact, the AiJbertson court specifically stated: 
"This is not a case in which, coinciding with 
the trauma, an injured seaman experienced and 
noticed only a minor injury and at a later 
time discovered an unexpected latent injury 
that was unknown and unknowable at the time of 
the traumatic event." 749 F.2d at 233. Thus, 
a worker's knowledge of physical annoyances 
caused by his work environment that are pre-
cursors of a more serious occupational disease 
does not necessarily constitute possession of 
or reasonable opportunity to discover the 
critical facts and cause of his injury, which 
is necessary to start the statute of limita-
tions. 
828 F.2d at 1107 (underlining added). 
Two examples of cases where the plaintiff did not have a 
strong suspicion, or was not able to get medical corroboration of 
a suspicion, are Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 
1980); and Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co. , Inc. . 129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 
181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1982), both of which are discussed in 
Point I of this brief. 
One case where a plaintiff apparently had no suspicion of the 
cause of her injuries is Mann v. A.H. Robins Co., 741 F.2d 79 (5th 
Cir. 1984), which involved an intrauterine device. A year after 
the device was implanted, the plaintiff became pregnant and 
miscarried. Shortly thereafter the device was removed but 
plaintiff began experiencing pain in her lower abdomen. Sixteen 
months later she had a hysterectomy due to endometriosis. Eleven 
years after first being fitted with the device and 8 years after 
the last injury, she discovered a link between her injuries and the 
device and filed suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
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court's grant of summary judgment, holding her claim did not accrue 
until the plaintiff both knew she had been injured and knew or 
reasonably should have known the cause of her injury. 
Another instructive case is Hando v. PPG Industries, 771 P.2d 
956 (Mont. 1989). In April 1982, Hando had the duty of painting 
various surfaces in the coal mine where she worked. The paint was 
manufactured by PPG Industries. Hando suffered adverse physical 
reactions to the paint at the time she used it, and believe at that 
time that certain physical and emotional problems she suffered were 
related to the chemical exposure. Hando visited several physicians 
concerning her problem, but was unable to get a physician to agree 
with her belief until 1984. She filed her complaint in October 
1985, more than three years after the exposure and onset of her 
ailments. PPG moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations 
grounds, the trial judge denied the motion, and PPG appealed. 
The Montana Supreme Court held that a statute of limitations 
is tolled "until a plaintiff discovers the injury, or until he 
should have discovered the injury with the use of due diligence, if 
the injury is self-concealing." 771 P. 2d at 961-62. The court 
stated: 
The facts in the present case indicate 
that although Hando was very much aware of 
those continuing physical, emotional and 
mental ailments she suffered after her ex-
posure to the paint, she did not know the 
cause of those injuries until May of 1984. 
Prior to that time, she and SCCC suspected 
that her ongoing ailments stemmed from her 
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exposure to the paint manufactured by PPG. 
She even filed a workers' compensation claim 
in May of 1982 based upon this belief. How-
ever , the veracity of her belief was not known 
until May of 1984. . . . 
. . . [W]e likewise hold that the three-year 
statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until a medical opinion was rendered in April-
May of 1984 linking her injuries to her ex-
posure to the PPG paint. 
771 P.2d at 962. 
Like the plaintiff in Pereira, the injury to Robert Larson 
occurred "without perceptible trauma." 181 Cal. Rptr at 369. In 
contrast to the plaintiff in Clay. Larson7s symptoms were worse on 
weekends when he was away from the toxic fumes. Unlike Albertson, 
who knew that TCE was dangerous, Larson testified he "always just 
thought of it as just a harmless type solvent and never thought 
about anything like that." (R. 993.) 
Although defendants have questioned wonder why Mr. Larson did 
not make a more diligent effort to obtain a medical diagnosis of 
his problem, a jury would not be required to find a lack of 
diligence on the facts of this case. Larson did seek medical help 
for the headaches, and received a medication that made him more 
sick. He inquired about the bleeding sinuses, but received no 
assistance. Although some people may, with hindsight, say he 
should have consulted other physicians, it cannot be said that no 
reasonable person would have failed to take further action. Among 
the most serious of Mr. Larson's injuries was the personality 
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changes and resulting abuse towards his wife and family, yet Mr. 
Larson was not aware of the problems at the time. It cannot be 
said that no reasonable person would have failed to take more 
action. The trial court erred in deciding this issue by summary 
judgment. The decision should be reversed and remanded for trial 
before a jury. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE ANY DISPUTED FACTS 
RELATING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
This case was decided by summary judgment, which by definition 
should be based only on "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Taking oral testimony 
is inconsistent with the rule that the court on summary judgment 
may not weigh the evidence, determine credibility issues, nor make 
findings. See, e.g., Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 
1292 (Utah 1978) ; Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 
Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970). 
Plaintiff had demanded a trial by jury. (R. 9.) Plaintiff 
argued in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant PPG's and Diamond Shamrock's Motion for Summary Judgment 
that the issue of when plaintiff discovered all facts related to 
his injury was for the jury, not the trial court. (R. 365-66.) 
The trial court nonetheless requested and held a hearing on the 
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statute of limitations issue. The holding of such a hearing was 
not improper, but could not have been used to resolve factual 
issues against plaintiff. The purpose of such a hearing was 
explained in State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989): 
[A] trial court has the discretion to consider 
evidence concerning running of a statute of 
limitations in pre-trial proceedings. If the 
evidence is sufficiently clear, the issue may 
be resolved as a matter of law at that junc-
ture , avoiding, perhaps, further proceedings. 
If, however, it cannot be said that as a 
matter of law the statutory period has run, 
the issue is a question of fact for the trier 
of fact. 
782 P.2d at 196 (citations and quotation marked omitted). Accord, 
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. , 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(any issues of fact concerning a statute of limitations defense 
must be submitted to jury). 
The evidence in this case was not clear and capable of 
supporting only a conclusion in favor of the defendants. See Point 
II above. To the extent the trial court used the evidentiary 
hearing to resolve any factual questions, the procedure was 
improper and prejudicial. The order of the trial court should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a jury determination of the 
statute of limitations issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in deciding disputed factual issues on 
a summary judgment motion. The facts support a finding that 
plaintiff reasonably did not discover until fall 1984 that his 
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various symptoms were all related to exposure to trichloroethylene 
which had occurred many years before. The summary judgment of 
dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 1993. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: / 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CIVIL NO. C-88-5604 
An evidentiary hearing was held on June 3, 1991 pursuant to 
Motions filed by the defendants Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. 
and PPG Industries. Plaintiff was represented by Stanley R. 
Smith. Defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were represented by 
Jay E. Jensen. Defendant Retep Corporation was represented by 
Alma G. Peterson. The causes of action against Thatcher 
Chemical Co. and Wasatch Chemical Co. were heretofore dismissed 
with prejudice. 
The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, read the 
Memoranda filed and took the matter under advisement. For some 
unknown reason the file was returned to the clerk's office 
without the Motion for Summary Judgment being ruled upon and 
counsel advised accordingly. The Court now enters its ruling. 
LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiff claims that during the years 1964 through 
1974 he was exposed to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE") 
while being in the employment of Black and Decker as a tool 
repairman, 
TCE was used to clean power tools. Employees, when using 
TCE, had available for their protection rubber gloves, air 
purifying respirators and ready access to a washroom. 
Plaintiff did not use the respirator at all times or wash his 
hands regularly when working with the TCE. 
Within a few months after being employed by Black and 
Decker, plaintiff began to experience physical and emotional 
symptoms, such as headaches, bleeding from the sinuses, 
dizziness, mood changes, irritability, lack of sex drive, 
memory loss, and he became abusive with his wife and family. 
Even though one or more of these symptoms manifested 
themselves, plaintiff did not seek medical attention. 
Plaintiff contends that while watching a television program 
in 1984 he was alerted to the potential harmful effects of 
TCE. However, it was not until some four years later that he 
filed this action. 
The issue presented to the Court is whether or not 
plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until plaintiff saw the television program in 
1984, about TCE which made him aware of his claim for injuries. 
The Court agrees that in some instances the statute does 
not begin to run until discovery of the cause of the injury is 
made by the claimant. 
The credible evidence leads the Court to find that the 
symptoms manifested themselves shortly after the exposure to 
TCE, but plaintiff did not pursue medical attention or attempt 
to learn what was causing his physical and emotional problems. 
This was not a case wherein the disease or ailment laid 
dormant or was latent before manifesting its symptoms; 
therefore, plaintiff would have no reason for not pursuing 
medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time. 
Plaintiff has been unable to ascertain the date he and his 
wife saw the television program in which the effects of TCE 
were discussed. In addition, the health care providers have 
not been able to definitely state that any of the plaintiff's 
symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE. 
The Court concludes that these defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted. 
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court refers the parties to these defendants7 
Memorandum and Reply Memorandum for additional reasons why the 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Dated this ° day of December, 1991. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
LARSON V, PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this (^ day of December, 1991: 
Stanley R. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 N. Center Street 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0310 
Jay E. Jensen 
Attorney for PPG and Diamond Shamrock 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Alma G. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendant Retep Corp. 
27 3 5 Thunderbird Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC, a 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS 
COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation; THATCHER CHEMICAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
WASATCH CHEMICAL COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; and RETEP 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-05604 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants PPG 
Industries, Inc., and Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, on or 
about May 25, 1990, came on for hearing before the Honorable John 
A. Rokich on July 30, 1990. The plaintiff was represented by 
Stanley R. Smith and defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were 
represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. Retep was present through its 
President, Alma G. Peterson, although it was not represented by 
counsel. Retep joined in the Motion in open Court. The Motion was 
held in abeyance for 90 days pending further discovery by the 
plaintiff. It came on for hearing a second time on January 7, 
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1991. Before ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
elected to conduct an evidentiary hearing which occurred on June 3, 
1991. Retep was neither present nor represented at the evidentiary 
hearing. The Court, having studied the memoranda filed by the 
parties, having considered the testimony offered by plaintiff and 
defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Order and Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The statute of limitations applicable to this case is 
§ 78-12-25(3), the general four year statute of limitations. 
2. The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run when 
the last event giving rise to the cause of action occurs which, in 
this case, was no later than December 31, 1974. 
3. The recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding 
the commencement of the statue of limitations, collectively known 
as the discovery rule, do not apply in this case because (a) there 
is no provision for the application of the discovery rule within 
the statute itself; (b) it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware 
of all of the symptoms of which he now complains by 1974, most of 
them within months of his first exposure to TCE in 1964 and 1965; 
(c) although plaintiff sought occasional medical attention for his 
various symptoms, it is undisputed that plaintiff made no effort to 
learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks after viewing 
an unidentified television program in 1984; (d) there is no 
evidence that defendants concealed or misled or attempted to 
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conceal or mislead or otherwise prevent plaintiff from learning any 
information about triclorolethylene and the potential side effects, 
if any, caused by exposure to triclorolethylene in the work place 
environment; (e) there are no exceptional circumstances which 
prevented plaintiff from seeking treatment and filing suit many 
years earlier than he did. 
4. To the extent the discovery rule may be applicable to 
this case, plaintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four years 
before making any effort to learn the cause of his symptoms was not 
justified, and reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to 
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt to determine whether 
his symptoms were caused by exposure to triclorolethylene prior to 
viewing the unidentified television program sometime in 1984. 
5. Plaintiff's long delay in attempting to connect his 
symptoms with his exposure to triclorolethylene has made it 
virtually impossible for the parties to discover credible evidence 
regarding who supplied the triclorolethylene to plaintiff's 
employer, whether all applicable instructions and warnings were 
transmitted by the distributors to the employer, whether the 
plaintiff was exposed to other chemicals, toxic substances, or 
circumstances which could account for his symptoms, and whether the 
symptoms from which plaintiff suffers were caused by exposure to 
triclorolethylene, all of which constitutes serious prejudice to 
the defendants should plaintiff be allowed to pursue his claim. 
6. For all other reasons set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Reply 
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Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment is entered herewith in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. Defendants are awarded their 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this / *7 day of ^ 2-Ylutr^ 1 9 9 ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
John;A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Stanley R. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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